Gavin Wood: Parachain Auction Design

The prerequisite for becoming a parachain on Polkadot is to obtain a parachain slot. The premise of getting a card slot is to pledge tokens first. We have defined two different types of parachain slots, one is called community beta slots and the other is called commercial slots. We hope to reserve 20% of the slots for the former. The community-tested parachains will be mainly deployed or supported by the Web3 Foundation. They are relatively fair and have no pre-mining. The remaining 80% of the card slots are public and for commercial purposes, and these 80% of the card slots will be opened through auctions. We ruled out the "bid auction" scenario, since some of these bids are submitted using smart contracts. The use of smart contract quotations is also out of our consideration of promoting a fair and transparent auction process. We ruled out a closed auction format, and we didn't want to apply a "possible auction process". In the end we decided on a candlestick auction with a retroactive closing mechanism. After opening the auction within a fixed window, bidders can post bids for 1-4 lease periods, each of 6 months. Bids become blocks of transactions. Bidders may submit multiple bids. Bidders are submitting bids for lease periods that should be contiguous, or adjacent to other bidders' bid lease periods. For 4 lease periods, it may also be divided into 10 sub-ranges. We store each of the winners in the 10 time ranges in the specified data structure. We need to ensure that there is no gap between the new bid and the winning price of the same bidder in another interval. If a certain bidder is currently the bidder for a certain period of lease, such as lease period 1-2, then he cannot bid for 4, unless someone beats him with a higher price in lease period 1-2. Gavin Wood: WebAssembly is the future of smart contracts: Jinse Finance reported that Polkadot founder Gavin Wood said in a speech at the 2021 Consensus Conference that EVM is very important to support the Polkadot blockchain system, at least in the foreseeable future. He sees WebAssembly as the future of smart contracts, but "traditional" EVMs are here now. It is reported that WebAssembly is a software format that can be used on the web and can be easily used with a variety of software languages. It's built by major web companies and runs on all major browsers. [2021/5/26 22:44:19] If the bid is not won, then this data block will be ignored. During this lease period, a new successful bidder will be updated, and a new successful bid price will be calculated. The new winner is calculated by selecting a combination of bids, multiplying the number of lease periods bid by all bids times the product of bids for each lease period, and the highest bidder is the winner. Once the bid is added to the block, the amount of the bid will be temporarily withheld. When a series of blocks representing the closing of auctions are generated, the random number mechanism will determine whether a previous block represents the closing block (closing block), and send the closing block to the winning bidder. or, and the staked lease period included in the block. The bidding money (DOTs) of the auctioneers who failed to bid will be returned to the original way after the auction. GavinWood: The Kusama parachain is expected to go online next Monday: Polkadot founder Gavin Wood said at the Polkadot Decoded community conference that the Kusama parachain is expected to go online next Monday. "This parachain refers to the Shell parachain (whiteboard chain). I wrote its Runtime in the past few weeks. It is very, very simple. It may be the simplest Runtime so far. It can hardly do anything, The only thing we can do is to wait for the upgrade to be approved. But this is an important first step, we can see the verification process of adding blocks and final confirmation, before we actually deploy some important things on it, such as Statemine Before the parachain (this is the Kusama version of Statemint), we will do some tests. We found some bugs, but they will be resolved soon. We will release 0.9.2 soon, which should be very soon, either today or tomorrow. We will focus on Observing its operation in several aspects, we will upgrade the Shell chain to Statemine after almost 24 hours of Shell’s stable operation.” In addition, the public welfare parachain Statemine is expected to go online within this week; it is expected to be launched a week or two after the Kusama auction Start the Polkadot auction. (PolkaWorld) [2021/5/20 22:25:10] Let bidders 1-3, the three are B1, B2, B3 respectively. Gavin Wood wrote an article in response to the questioning of the avalanche protocol: the avalanche protocol is not safe and has no scalability: Golden Finance According to reports, on July 28, a member of the Avalanche Protocol collected some doubts about Polkadot within the Avalanche Protocol community and posted them on the Polkadot Riot official group. derogation of performance. Gavin Wood, the co-founder of Polkadot, responded to this matter. The so-called subnet security of the Avalanche protocol is completely different from the shared security of Polkadot. How about a performance comparison. In effect, the Avalanche protocol acts like a centralized universe, with overlapping sets of elected validators acting as subnetwork security. This will lead to a great disparity in the security of the various chains in the entire system. Cross-shard attacks are possible because messages from one (less secure) chain can cause state transitions on another (more secure) subnet. In this way, the security of the entire network is equivalent to the chain with the worst security. As with the Cosmos problem, any solution that attempts to design a central area to enforce sensitive logic will encounter scalability bottlenecks and degrade some chains into second-class citizens whose state transitions cannot be trusted. No matter which chain the program is executed on, it has the same level of security guarantee. This is a scalable system. To sum up, the avalanche protocol is neither secure nor scalable. [2020/7/29] For example, there is a group of auctioneers who want to bid for some card slots. Bidder 1 submitted (1-4, 75 DOTs), expressing his desire to bid for the first to fourth phases (every 6 months symbolizes a lease period). -4,90DOT) (indicating only bidding for the third and fourth phases of one card slot, which is the right to use the card slot for the next year), bidder 3 submits (1-2,30DOT) (indicating only bidding for one card The first and second phases of the card slot, that is, the right to use the card slot in the previous year), because the weighted total asking price of B2 and B3 is 240DOT (90*2+30*2), on average, each lease The bidding price for each lease period is 60DOT (240DOT/4=60DOT). In comparison, the average bidding price of B1 for each lease period is 75DOT, which is much higher than that of B2 and B3, so B1 voted for all lease periods (1-4). News | Polkadot test network Kusama has resumed block production, and Gavin Wood issued an article detailing the bug solution: Polkadot test network Kusama, which was down yesterday, has now resumed block production. Polkadot founder Gavin Wood responded to the vulnerability Troubleshooting and fixes published reports. It was previously reported that the entire Kusama testnet was down yesterday due to the placement of the Polkadot mainnet runtime environment library in the Kusama upgrade. The team promised yesterday to work on fixing the bug the next day. Currently, after an update, the Kusama network has resumed block generation. On the eve of the update of the repaired version, Polkadot founder Gavin Wood shared the repair report of this major Kusama vulnerability on Medium. Kusama has now restarted after a few simple fixes and syncs through a concerted effort by the node community. [2020/1/7] If the bidder has his own set price and the price is public, we can use the English auction; if there is only an objective valuation amount but it is not disclosed, then we can use the Vickrey auction (Vickrey auction) Auction). Both auctions feature underdog-dominated strategies, and the best bidders can do is realistically assess their valuations. Voice | Gavin Wood: Polkadot has successfully run a Substrate-based parallel chain: Dr. Gavin Wood, co-founder of Ethereum and founder of Polkadot and Parity, tweeted: Polkadot has successfully run a Substrate-based parallel chain, and Cumulus will soon later. [2019/10/23] Compared with the English auction, our auction format will have two big differences: (1) First, the candle auction will have an approximate closing time range, (2) and allow every A bidder's pricing can be made public or choose not to. The fairness here means that in the candle auction mechanism, the buyer with a higher bid will have a higher bid winning rate than other auctioneers, so that in an auction mechanism where the auction time ends randomly, the highest bid among all auctioneers More people can win the bid, and the higher bid winning rate can be estimated from the difference in bids. A random closing time, simulating the actual candle auction candle, when the candle is blown randomly, it means the auction is over. Therefore, a random closing time also means that bidders should carefully submit their bids and submit them before the roughly estimated end time of the auction. This mechanism also prevents sniping behavior in the auction. Otherwise, the random ending auction mechanism will not damage the fairness of auctioneers who do not make their bids public. For a completely open and transparent auction process on smart contracts, it is relatively fair to use candle auctions. In such a condition where the auction ends randomly and the auctioneer carefully submits the bid, the person who maliciously sabotages the auction also needs to bear high cost risks. Griefing refers to bidding above the estimated price to force the winner to pay more. We want to present a smart contract strategy where, when rationally assumed, no one bids more than their own maximum valuation. In the case of using Epsilon equilibrium (also known as: approximate Nash equilibrium, refer to "Algorithmic Game Theory"), the almost dominant game strategy can satisfy the existence of Nash equilibrium points within certain well-defined ε (Epsilon) factors. We tracked that bids above estimate (i.e. with the intent to sabotage the bid) created a risk of loss for those bidders. We hope to find a strategy that minimizes the disadvantages of smart contracts compared to bidding mechanisms with closed auctions (tender system). Let's assume we have a bidder with a bid price (valuation) for an auction item, i.e. a parachain slot. We set a to increase the price and want to find a strategy Sp bidder P as follows. If the following two conditions are met: P does not win in the last block, for the winning bid, b, the last block is held and then P bids in the next block If the following two conditions are met: n is the number of blocks, and also represents the number of auctions The total number of rounds selects the α markup range, which is a trade-off between avoiding overpayment and increasing the chance of winning. When the number of bidding rounds n is relatively large, the price increase range a can be small, and when the total number of bidding rounds n is relatively small, the price increase range a needs to be large. Larger alpha markups increase the chances of winning, but may result in unnecessary overpayments for the winner. Next, we first describe the winning chance and utility of the smart contract, and then use the total number of blocks to calculate the markup α to evaluate the last block P, and the highest valuation of all other bidders. Set: When there are at most blocks, it represents the total number of rounds of bidding. P did not win, assuming that there are a total of n blocks, we want to calculate the probability of P winning when the following conditions are met: If no one bids his own bid other maximum bids and   bids less than P are less than the probability of P winning At least as follows: where (1/a -1) is the probability that P will not win the auction. If V(1-a) > Vmax, then P will win with a higher probability. Now, let us assume that P wins. How much does it cost? What is its utility? Once P wins the bid in the auction, its utility refers to the amount saved by the bidder compared with the real value of the current boaudi. The utility is defined as follows.   If P wins the bid, the utility is aV where b is the winning bid price in the block at the end of the auction. The most that P has to pay is Vmax+aV. The expected saving of P is at least equal to the probability of P winning multiplied by the maximum cost P pays. We compare the expected utility with V - Vmax, which is the maximum result that guarantees the utility P against other bidding strategies. We need to distinguish between the two to find the value of , to ensure that the winning bidder can at least save the auctioneer some unnecessary expenses. Next, we will explore the Nash equilibrium point.

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